Good Samaritan Statute: Should Emergency Physicians be Levites or Samaritans?
By Vicky A. Trompler, MD, JD, Medical Malpractice Defense Attorney, Fowler, Wiles & Keith, LLP, Dallas, Texas.
If an emergency physician happens upon a victim of a motor vehicle accident as she travels home from work, should she stop and render aid? Should she respond to a hospital in-patient cardiac arrest on the floor while she is working a shift in the ED? Do Good Samaritan statutes protect emergency medical technicians when offering emergency aid? When an earthquake destroys part of a city, should off-duty EMTs and emergency physicians take part in the disaster response? In these scenarios, can the health care providers be sued, and if sued, is liability likely?
Good Samaritan legislation of some type has been passed in every state to protect both health care professionals and/or laypersons from liability for their acts or omissions occurring in attempts to render emergency medical aid to ill or injured people. This legislation has been named for the compassionate biblical volunteer described in Luke 10:25-37, which describes a man who was attacked by thieves while traveling to Jericho and was left by the side of a road. A priest and a Levite passed by the victim but did not stop. When the Samaritan arrived, he felt compassion for the injured man and poured water and wine into his wounds. He then bandaged the wounds and transported the injured man to an inn and paid the innkeeper.
To understand how Good Samaritan statutes protect the health care giver, one must view them in light of their common law background. There is a distinct difference between an ethical duty and a legal duty. Most physicians would feel ethically compelled to render aid at the scene of an accident. However, under common law, a passerby who finds another person in an emergency situation has no affirmative obligation to render that person aid, absent a special relationship between the parties, unless that passerby has brought about the situation. If she does offer aid however, she has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid further injury to the victim. Therefore, at common law, failure to exercise reasonable care exposes a passerby to potential liability for damages caused by negligent acts or omissions. The "Good Samaritan" who stops to help may find himself liable for damages while the priest and Levite who passed by have no liability.1
These statutes vary from state to state, and all physicians should understand how the Good Samaritan is covered in their particular state statute and how it applies to their individual practices. The statute in some states covers only physicians, while the statute in other states applies to everyone else. (See Table and Statutes.)
Good Samaritan is an affirmative defense in a medical malpractice action. The defense team must raise the defense, or it is waived. The defense attorney raises the defense by submitting a motion to dismiss. The court then considers the motion. If the court holds the defense applicable, then the case is dismissed only with regard to the defendant that raised the Good Samaritan defense. If there is solid precedent in the jurisdiction, an appeal is unlikely. However, if there is little or no prior case law on point, the plaintiff’s attorney will file an appeal specifically addressing the Good Samaritan defense. It is important to understand that a plaintiff always has the right to file a malpractice claim and initiate the process of litigation. It is only after the litigation is underway that the Good Samaritan defense is asserted and a motion is made to dismiss.
The majority of statutes maintain that the rescuer must not have any preexisting duty to the victim, such as a physician-patient relationship, and the rescuer must not have caused the emergency condition. The majority of the statutes that protect physicians state that the physician must not receive compensation for the care of the victim. In addition, in most states, the rescuer has no potential exposure to liability unless the action is intentionally harmful or grossly negligent. If the physician gives reasonable care, as provided by common law, he or she is protected from liability. For example, the Good Samaritan could only be sued successfully if pouring oil and wine into the wound was proved to be grossly negligent or intentionally harmful.
While the Good Samaritan statutes were created for out-of-hospital medical emergencies, several state jurisdictions have held that the statute applies to certain in-hospital emergency situations.3,4
Outside the Hospital
Fear of litigation should not stop a physician from rendering aid in an out-of-hospital emergency situation. It was good public policy for states to enact Good Samaritan laws to protect individuals who were trying to comply with their ethical obligation to help injured victims outside the hospital.
Case 1
On his way home from working the 3:00-11:00 shift in the ED, Dr. "A" witnessed a severe motor vehicle accident in which a van turned over, throwing three children into a ravine. He stopped to offer aid to the children, finding one child in cardiac arrest, and another with shortness of breath with an obvious tension pneumothorax.
The physician took out his emergency kit ,which he carried in the trunk of his car for just such an occasion, and inserted a catheter into the tension pneumothorax of the child in distress, saving his life. When paramedics arrived at the scene, they began CPR on the pulseless child. He was pronounced dead at the hospital.
A wrongful death lawsuit was brought against the emergency physician for inappropriate and inadequate resuscitation of the dead child.
It is for this type of suit that state legislatures initially passed Good Samaritan statutes. Although a plaintiff’s attorney may file this type of lawsuit, if there is no gross negligence, no remuneration or previous physician-patient relationship, this physician can probably be dismissed from this lawsuit in the majority of states.
It is the emergency physician who would be the most qualified to aid in this type of situation and fear of litigation should not deter him from attempting to render aid. Even though she had no legal duty to render this aid, the statutes would allow her to act on his ethical duty.
Case 2
While entering the building in which he lived, Dr. Vincent Arolay was called by the superintendent’s wife. She asked him to please come to the aid of her husband who was in distress. Dr. Arolay took the patient’s pulse and heart rate and called the police, ordering an ambulance to transport him to the hospital. When Dr. Arolay approached the superintendent, he was "very sick and moribund." Dr. Arolay told the patient’s wife that her husband was a very sick man and he could not help him in any way and that he needed immediate hospitalization.
Dr. Arolay was a general medical practitioner who had practiced medicine for fifty-five years and he believed that the patient had a slim chance of survival. After calling for the ambulance, Dr. Arolay left the patient’s apartment.
Susan Rodriguez, the patient’s wife, commenced an action against Dr. Arolay alleging that the medical treatment rendered her now deceased husband, Jose Rodriguez, was negligent. The complaint stated that "prior to his death, the decedent did consult with the defendant, Vincent Arolay, for the purpose of receiving treatment, care, and diagnosis of a condition then afflicting him."
The court found that New York’s Good Samaritan statute was applicable in Dr. Arolay’s case. They found there was no legal basis to impose liability upon Dr. Arolay unless there had been gross negligence. There was never a complaint of gross negligence against Dr. Arolay; therefore, there was no basis for liability.
The court further found that "a physician who does no more than arrange, under emergency conditions, for a neighbor to be taken to a hospital, should not become and remain a defendant in a lawsuit.5
Although this type of scenario is rare, it is in the public’s best interest that the physicians in this world not be afraid to assist a neighbor in distress. This is the fundamental reason that all fifty states have addressed the Good Samaritan issue.
Inside the Hospital
Case 3
A 60-year-old woman was admitted to her Texas hospital by her OB/GYN physician for pelvic surgery to treat chronic pelvic pain, uterine prolapse, and urinary incontinence. The on-call anesthesiologist administered anesthesia for this operative procedure. On the operative report, the intubation was described as "difficult."
The patient apparently had some difficulty immediately post-op and was reintubated when she developed respiratory problems. From the recovery room, she was admitted to the intensive care unit and placed on a ventilator. A pulmonologist was consulted to evaluate her pulmonary status. The next morning, the pulmonologist evaluated the patient in the ICU and elected to remove her endotracheal tube. Approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes later, she suddenly developed upper airway obstruction and had some distress in breathing. According to the nurses, the patient made some crowing noises when she was breathing.
The ICU nurses immediately called for assistance for this emergency situation. Doctor "C," another anesthesiologist in the hospital who was not the patient’s treating physician nor her anesthesiologist at the time of the surgery, responded immediately to assist the nurses and other physicians in the intensive care unit.
According to the nurse’s notes, Dr. C’s first attempted intubation was unsuccessful. The patient had anatomic difficulties and she was ventilated by mask. The patient was ultimately intubated via fiberoptic bronchoscopy by the pulmonologist. Post-resuscitation, the patient suffered hypoxic encephalopathy.
Dr. "C," the anesthesiologist responding to the emergency situation, did not charge the patient for any services. He did not have a previous physician-patient relationship with this woman. However, Dr. "C," the hospital, and the pulmonologist were all named as defendants in a lawsuit brought by the patient.
This case raises several important issues. Although Dr. "C" was an anesthesiologist and not an emergency physician, many emergency physicians have found themselves in similar situations. They are working in the ED and called to assist on a code on the floor or in the recovery room. If there is a bad outcome, there is always a potential for legal action.
In this particular case, Dr. "C’s" defense attorney filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss the case against Dr. "C" based upon the Good Samaritan statute. The plaintiff’s attorney voluntarily dismissed Dr. "C" after the motion for summary judgment was filed with the court. Dr. "C" had no physician-patient relationship (i.e., he had neither seen or cared for this patient in the past, nor did he have a contractual agreement with the hospital to assume a physician-patient relationship). In addition, he did not ask for remuneration for services rendered, and he was responding as the "Good Samaritan in an emergency situation." Finally, Dr. "C" was not willfully or wantonly negligent when he was unable to intubate the patient due to her anatomical variances.
Case 4
A two-month-old child was brought to the ED with CPR in progress. A pediatrician on another floor in the hospital was informed of a hospital emergency call over the loudspeaker for the pediatrician to report immediately to the emergency room. When the pediatrician arrived in the ED, he saw the emergency physician performing CPR on the infant. The pediatrician assisted the emergency physician in attempting to resuscitate the child. When efforts were unsuccessful, the pediatrician pronounced the infant dead when he noted that the infant’s pupils were fixed and dilated, and the cardiac monitor showed no activity. However, the family stayed in the room with the infant, awaiting the arrival of the medical examiner. While they were waiting, they noted some movement of the child. Approximately one and one-half hours later, a pulse was found, and the infant was transported to another hospital.
The infant ultimately succumbed to cardiac and respiratory arrest several days later. Both the pediatrician and the emergency physician were named in this lawsuit. The 14th District Court of Appeals of Texas found that the Texas Good Samaritan statute, applicable at the time, was an affirmative defense for the pediatrician.4
The Texas Good Samaritan law was amended in 1993 after the factual events in this case occurred. The version of the law applicable this case stated "a person who in good faith administers emergency care at the scene of an emergency or in a hospital, is not liable in civil damages for an act performed during the emergency, unless the act is willfully or wantonly negligent."6 Ironically, this version of the Good Samaritan law did not offer emergency physicians or personnel any protection because it did not apply to "a person who regularly administered care in the hospital emergency room." In this case the law apply to a pediatrician providing care in an ED.
In 1993, the 73rd Legislature amended the statute to protect emergency physicians who were present at the scene of an emergency for reasons wholly unrelated to that person’s work in administering health care. The same revision of the Texas Good Samaritan statute did not allow for protection of a person who in good faith administers emergency care within the hospital if that care is provided by: "(1) a person who regularly administers care in a hospital emergency room unless such person is at the scene of the emergency for reasons wholly unrelated to the person's work in administering health care; or (2) an admitting or attending physician of the patient or a treating physician associated by the admitting or attending physician of the patient in question."7
Therefore, Texas law as it stands, may offer protection to the emergency physician who is at the scene of an emergency outside of a hospital, but not within the hospital ED unless he is at the scene of the emergency for reasons wholly unrelated to his work in administering health care.
Case 5
Mr. L. John Kearney suffered a life-threatening traumatic injury in Alaska and was taken by ambulance to the emergency room of Kodiak Island Hospital (KIH). When he arrived, Mr. Kearney was examined by the on-call emergency physician who was also a family practitioner. Upon the ED physician’s determination that a surgical consult was necessary, Dr. Gill, a surgeon with staff privileges at KIH was consulted. After ordering certain tests, Dr. Gill was of the opinion that Mr. Kearney could not survive a transfer to Anchorage, and, in an effort to save Mr. Kearney’s life, Dr. Gill performed emergency surgery which lasted 9-10 hours.
Following a bad outcome, Dr. Gill was sued for negligence. His attorney filed a motion for summary judgment based in part on the Good Samaritan statute. The trial court ruled that the Good Samaritan statute was not applicable to Dr. Gill because he was acting under a preexisting duty to render the emergency care he provided to Mr. Kearney. The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s decision and ruled that the trial court did not err when it ruled that Dr. Gill was not immune from liability under the Good Samaritan statute. The court further stated that "the Good Samaritan statute did not apply to physicians already under a duty to provide medical care."
In analyzing whether or not Dr. Gill had a preexisting duty, the trial court had taken into consideration the contract Dr. Gill had with KIH and had considered the bylaws of the medical and dental staff of KIH.
The trial court concluded that, by contract with the Hospital, specialists such as Dr. Gill were relieved from regular rotational on-call duty in the emergency room at the hospital. In lieu of that on-call duty, Dr. Gill, as a specialist, agreed not to serve rotational emergency room on-call duty but instead would be available to respond to the general practitioners who were on duty in the emergency room and needed to consult with such specialists.
Given the ambiguity of the language in the bylaws and rules and regulations of KIH in effect at the time of Mr. Kearney’s accident, the appellate court determined that the trial court had erred in determining, as a matter of law, that the bylaws and rules created a preexisting duty which deprived Dr. Gill of the right to claim that he was immune under the Good Samaritan statute. Despite this error in the Trial Court’s reasoning, Dr. Gill’s motion for summary judgment was found to be properly denied, based on the ruling that there was an issue of fact regarding bylaws and regulations and the issue could not be determined as a matter of law under the record before the Appeal Court.8
Case 6
Ina Booth Perkins had hip replacement surgery. Her surgeon was Dr. John Lang. Dr. Clyde O’Neill was scheduled to assist in the surgical procedure. Prior to the operation, Dr. O’Neill called Dr. Lang complaining that he had was ill with the flu. Dr. Lang urged Dr. O’Neill to assist him because it would be difficult to obtain another assistant surgeon at that late hour. Dr. O’Neill agreed to attempt to assist in the 7:30 a.m. surgery. At some point early in the procedure, Dr. O’Neill became so ill that he had to lie down on the OR floor and subsequently left the room.
The hospital then called Dr. Howard, who was seeing patients in his office located in an adjacent building. Dr. Howard was asked if he would "step in as assistant surgeon and complete the ongoing surgery" with Dr. Lang. Dr. Howard proceeded to cancel his remaining appointments and went to the hospital to assist the surgery.
After the surgery, Ms. Perkins allegedly suffered "severe pain, numbness, and inability to move" areas of her left foot, ankle, and leg. She claimed that these symptoms were a result of injury to her sciatic nerve.
The appellate court determined that the trial court properly determined by way of summary judgment, that Dr. Howard had an absolute defense based on one of California’s Good Samaritan statutes (Business and Professions Code, §2396). This statute gives protection to a physician who, in good faith, renders emergency medical care to a person at the request of another physician.
That section confirms immunity from liability upon a physician who, in good faith, renders emergency medical care to a person at the request of another physician. Dr. Howard did not have a financial interest in Dr. Lang’s treatment of Ms. Perkins, and he did not have an employment obligation to respond. Dr. Howard was truly acting as a "volunteer" when he came to the operating room.9
In summary, a minority of states have allowed Good Samaritan immunity to enter the hospital. In the medical malpractice environment, every tool must be used to combat inappropriate litigation. Emergency physicians should be aware whether or not their state provides Good Samaritan protection for in-house emergencies.
Contract Issues
Emergency physician groups have several contract options with regard to coverage of in-house emergencies. The wording of the group’s contract with the hospital may influence Good Samaritan coverage for in-house emergencies. Many contracts with hospital emergency groups do not mention in-house coverage, others disallow emergency physicians from responding to in-hospital emergencies, and still others specifically address the issue requiring emergency physicians to respond to in-house emergencies. Emergency physicians should also be aware of any bylaws or department regulations that address the ED’s obligations to patients who are admitted to the hospital. If the group-hospital contract or hospital bylaws or regulations create a preexisting duty for the emergency physician to respond to in-house emergencies, the state Good Samaritan Statute will probably not apply.
The emergency physicians or the emergency physician group should seek an opinion from a health care attorney regarding the possibility of Good Samaritan coverage of in-house emergencies in their particular state. If the emergency physicians view in-house coverage as a reimbursement opportunity and charge fee-for-service for those services or charge the hospital, then the issue is moot and Good Samaritan is not applicable. However, if the group does not bill for these services, and the law is applicable to in-hospital care, then great care should be taken in crafting the group-hospital contract. Stipends and other areas of compensation should not be related to in-house coverage.
Emergency physicians working with contract groups should be familiar with the group’s contractual obligations regarding in-house coverage. Again, if a preexisting duty exists, either through a hospital contract, or through hospital bylaws, then in most states the Good Samaritan statutes are not applicable.
Good Samaritan and EMS Providers
Between 1987 and 1992, statutory immunity from liability was used as a defense in 53% of all cases involving public and private EMS providers. The three types of immunity used in these cases were: (a) sovereign immunity; (b) emergency medical care immunity; and (c) Good Samaritan immunity.10
Sovereign Immunity
The common law concept of sovereign immunity originated in the ancient English doctrine stating that the "King could do no wrong." This concept has been carried over in the United States to protect local, state, and federal government from lawsuits. This governmental immunity is justified because it allows state activities that are beneficial to the public, such as police and fire protection and emergency medical services, but potentially may be harmful to a single individual.
Although EMS agencies are many times financially reimbursed by the patient after services are rendered, many courts have ruled that public EMS agencies are protected by sovereign immunity.10
Emergency Medical Care Statutes
In the published cases from 1987 to 1992, 19% of the cases involving EMS used emergency medical care statutes enacted by some state legislatures specifically to provide immunity for EMS providers. These statutes, which are similar to sovereign immunity statutes, were enacted to ensure the availability of adequate emergency treatment to those requiring it. An Ohio statute protects those providing emergency medical care in that state. In Nevada, there are statutes to protect persons seeking treatment for reluctant mentally ill patients. The New York statute protects only volunteer EMTs, whereas other states have statutes to protect private EMTs (e.g., the state of Michigan).10
Good Samaritan Acts
Again, in the published cases from 1987 to 1992, the Good Samaritan defense was used three times by EMS agencies or EMTs. The plaintiff was able to prevail in only one of those cases reviewed. In that one case, the court remanded the case to the Trial Court to determine whether the defendant met the restrictions of that state’s Good Samaritan Law.10
Case 7
Helga Robertson was driving southbound on Highway 191, a four-lane highway south of Moab, Utah. Helga’s sister-in-law, Joyce Robertson, was a passenger in Helga’s vehicle. Helga’s car struck Betty Daniels at approximately 7:50 p.m. while Ms. Daniels was walking across Highway 191.
Helga moved the car to the side of the road, at the request of her sister-in-law, to prevent it from being struck. Ms. Robertson and her sister-in-law then proceeded to assist Ms. Daniels. Joan Flynn arrived at the accident scene and stopped her van in the outside lane of the highway near Ms. Daniels, turning on her vans flashing emergency lights. Ms. Flynn then went to assist Ms. Daniels, who was near the center lane of the highway. While Ms. Flynn was assisting, Joyce Robertson went to call for help.
Shortly thereafter, three National Park Service (NPS) employees with a truck that was equipped with emergency lights and sirens, stopped to assist. They pulled their vehicle toward the shoulder of the highway, turning on their emergency lights. A few seconds after the NPS vehicle arrived, a pick-up truck driven by Kenneth Partridge swerved and hit Helga Robertson, Joan Flynn, and Betty Daniels, all of whom were positioned in the middle of the highway.
Mr. Partridge later testified that he was distracted by the emergency lights on the NPS vehicle. Plaintiffs claimed that the NPS employees were negligent in failing to place their vehicle in a position where it would block traffic from striking Ms. Daniels and the rescuers, in stopping their vehicle on the side of the road and away from the accident, in activating their emergency lights thereby distracting other drivers, in activating their siren and emergency lights, thereby distracting the pedestrians, and in having the controls of the emergency lights and siren improperly installed.
The district court held that the NPS employees owed no duty to Ms. Flynn under Utah’s Good Samaritan Act. The appellate court upheld the finding of the trial court. The Utah statute grants immunity "for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission by the person rendering the emergency care, . . ." (Utah Code Ann. §78-11-22). The statute covered any acts or omissions by the NPS officers.11
Case 8
Nancy Clarken sought damages for the death of her husband, allegedly as a result of the negligence of the EMTs employed by a government-owned hospital.
Matthew Clarken suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest while a guest at a h.otel located on the United States Military Academy at West Point in New York. After the hotel staff notified the Keller Army Community Hospital, the Hospital dispatched an ambulance.
The ambulance was staffed by two U.S. Army medics, Privates Carlos Smith and John Stratiff. Mr. Clarken lost consciousness shortly after the medics arrived and, although he was eventually resuscitated at the hospital, he suffered severe brain damage and ultimately died in a vegetative state.
The plaintiffs alleged that Stratiff and Smith did not attempt to take a blood pressure reading after Mr. Clarken became unconscious. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that: no cardiopulmonary resuscitation was begun until the decedent was placed into the ambulance; decedent vomited but there was no suctioning of the oral cavity; medical personnel deviated from the acceptable standard of care with tragic consequences; Stratiff and Smith failed to secure an airway by inserting an oral airway; and that they failed to provide supplemental oxygen in a timely manner.
The basic premise of the New York Good Samaritan statute "is to induce the voluntary rescue by removing fear of potential liability which acts as an impediment to such rescue." The court found that the Clarken case was within the Good Samaritan statute of New York. The military was under no duty to provide emergency relief to civilians present on its premises, but did so voluntarily. The court found that the EMTs and ambulance operating out of the Keller Community Hospital were the virtual equivalent of a volunteer ambulance unit.12
Both of the examples cited above, Case 7 and Case 8, represent an emergency medical services use of the Good Samaritan statute as a defense. Generally, Good Samaritan statutes provides broad immunity for individuals who render emergency care at the scene of an accident. However, not all jurisdictions specifically provide EMS coverage, and the statutes generally require good faith actions that are neither billed nor reimbursed, and in which there is no pre-existing duty.
Potential Good Samaritan Coverage in Disaster Situations
Disaster situations potentially place emergency physicians and the entire emergency medical community at an increased risk of litigation. During disasters, emergency medical care is modified according to the type of disaster, number of victims, and availability of emergency and medical resources. Since it is unlikely that an injured victin would receive routine emergency medical treatement (standard of care) during a disaster, the risk of liability litigation of health care providers is increased. The potential Good samaritan coverage of health care providers in a disaster situation would liekly depend on the the legal determination of preexisting duty. If a state or city had a comprehensive disaster plan that provided precise instructions for each health care provider in the even of a disaster, a plaintiff (disaster victim) might argue that there was a preexisting duty by a health care provider in that community as outlined in the disaster plan document. Those communities without such a well-defined disaster plan could argue that there was no preexisting duty and the Good Samaritan statutes should apply. Sincere there is no precedent in the legal literature regarding this question, the answer will be determined either in the individual state legislatures or in future court decisions.
Conclusion
State legislatures have provided limited legal protection from liability in order to encourage health professionals to assist at the scene of an accident, and, in some states, during emergencies within the hospital. Although every state has enacted some form of Good Samaritan statue, it is important for emergency physicians and EMTs to be familiar with the scope of Good Samaritan protection in their state. In addition, it is important for emergency physicians to be familiar with hospital bylaws and all contracts that may create a duty of care. Health care attorneys can provide valuable information regarding in-hospital Good Samaritan coverage. There may be contract strategies that may allow Good Samaritan protection for emergency physicians responding to in-house emergencies.
References
1. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §56, at 341-44 (4th Ed. 1971)
2. Mapel FB, Weizel CL. "Good Samaritan LawsWho Needs Them? The current state of Good Samaritan protection in the United States" South Texas Law Review 1982;21:327-354.
3. Pemverpon v. Dharmani; 207 Mich. App. 522: 525 N.W. 2d 497 (1994)
4. Hernandez v. Lukefahr; 879 S.W. 2d 137 (1994)
5. Rodriguez v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 505 N.Y.S. 2d 345 (1986)
6. Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Ann. 74.001 (a)(prior to the 1993 revision)
7. Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Ann. 74.001(a)(after 1993 revision)
8. Deal v. Kearney, 851 P.2d 1353 (1993)
9. Perkins v. Howard, 232 Cal. App. 3d 708, 283 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1991)
10. Morgan DL, et al. "Liability Immunity as a Legal Defense for Recent Emergency Medical Services Litigation" Pre-Hospital and Disaster Medicine 1995;10(2):82-91
11. Flynn v. United States of America, 902 F.2d 1524 (1990)
12. Clarken v. United States of America, 791 F.Supp. 1029 (1992)
Physician CME Questions
24. Which of the following is not an element of most Good Samaritan statutes?
a. Protection of lay persons or health care providers responding to an emergency;
b. Protection of lay persons or health care providers for their acts or omissions in the attempt to render aid to ill or injured persons;
c. Protection of lay persons or health care providers who charge for their services in an emergency situation; and
d. Protection of lay persons or health care providers who act reasonably under the circumstances.
25. If your state’s Good Samaritan statute offers potential protection within a hospital situation, and you find yourself responding to such an emergency situation on the floor in your hospital, you should do all of the following except:
a. carefully document the situation and care provided;
b. ask for payment by remitting a bill if you would like to maintain the potential protection of the Good Samaritan statute;
c. provide reasonable care under the circumstances; or
d. be familiar with your contractual arrangements with the hospital or the hospital’s bylaws.
26. Which of the following statements is true?
a. Not all states have some sort of Good Samaritan law;
b. It is ethical to ignore an injured victim on the side of the road;
c. You do not have a legal duty to stop and render aid to an injured victim on the side of the road in most instances;
d. You may intentionally harm an injured victim on the side of the road and still be protected by a Good Samaritan law.
27. Which of the following statements is true?
a. Emergency physicians should be aware of their jurisdiction’s applicable Good Samaritan statutes so that they can fully understand the extent of the duty they are assigned or the protection afforded them;
b. Grossly negligent acts are typically protected by most Good Samaritan laws;
c. Good Samaritan laws, as a rule, apply to the routine practice of emergency medicine; and
d. Good Samaritan laws apply to in-hospital situations in all states.
You have reached your article limit for the month. Subscribe now to access this article plus other member-only content.
- Award-winning Medical Content
- Latest Advances & Development in Medicine
- Unbiased Content